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During the last quarter century, mortgage interest deductibility has been gradually phased out.  In
1974 a ceiling was set on the size of the mortgage eligible for interest deductibility (£30,000 since 1983), and,
beginning in 1993, the maximum rate at which interest under that ceiling could be deducted was reduced in
four steps to zero in 1999.  The combination of these changes gives a rich array of different debt tax penalties
for different households in different years.  We analyze over 117,000 loans originated in the UK during the
1988-91 and 1995-98 periods to finance home purchases.  We first estimate a logit to predict whether a
household’s loan exceeds the £30,000 ceiling.  These predicted probabilities are then employed to construct
debt tax penalty variables that are used to explain household LTVs on loans to finance home purchases.  The
penalty variables depend on the predicted probability of having a loan that exceeds the ceiling, the market
mortgage rate, and exogenous household specific tax rates.  From these results we compute estimates of the
impact of removing deductibility on initial LTVs in the UK and on the weighted average cost of capital for
owner-occupied housing.  Removal of deductibility is estimated to reduce initial LTVs, which mitigates the
rise in the weighted average cost of capital, by about 30 percent, with the reduction varying with household
age, loan size (above or below the £30,000 limit) and tax bracket.
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Periodically people propose removal of the home mortgage interest deduction in the U.S. (Follain 
and Melamed, 1998).  The primary motivation for such proposals is recapture of tax revenue lost by the 
deduction – it is a major “tax expenditure.”  According to Follain and Melamed the official annual 
expenditure in the middle 1990s was $40 to $50 billion.
1  Numerous advocates would prefer to use these 
funds in a multitude of different ways.  A secondary argument for removal of the deduction is that the 
expenditure is sharply skewed toward higher income households who are more likely to be homeowners and 
to finance large houses. 
On the other hand, the mortgage interest deduction encourages home ownership and others argue that 
home ownership provides many positive externalities and thus ought to be encouraged.  These include that 
ownership leads households to better maintain their dwellings and to raise children that do better on 
achievement tests and have fewer behavioral problems (Haurin, et. al., 2002).  Moreover, eliminating the 
mortgage interest deduction wouldn’t remove the fundamental tax advantage to home ownership – the 
favorable tax treatment of capital gains and imputed rents (Hendershott and Slemrod, 1983), but would just 
restrict the advantage to wealthy households that do not need to use debt finance (Woodward and Weicher, 
1989). 
This paper is not about the appropriateness of the mortgage interest deduction.  Rather it is about the 
impact of the deduction on the use of debt to finance house purchases.  This topic is crucial to both the 
amount the deduction lowers government tax revenue and the impact of deductibility on homeownership.  If 
households were to sell taxable bond holdings to mortgage lenders and pay off their entire mortgage debt in 
response to elimination of deductibility, the government would gain no tax revenue and the cost of financing 
home ownership would be unchanged (assuming households and lenders pay the same tax rate).  Portfolio 
reallocations with no real or tax consequences would be the sole result.  At the other extreme, if households 
                                                           
1 Inland Revenue estimated the expenditure to be nearly £8 billion in 1990/91 (Devereux and Lanot, 2001, p 
2).  
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did not reduce their leverage, their after-tax income would fall and both the cost of homeownership and 
government tax revenues would rise significantly.  Estimating where between these polar extremes 
household behavior lies is the purpose of this paper. 
The fundamental tax advantage to owner-occupied housing is the generally low taxation of the return 
on the equity invested in the house (Hendershott and White, 2000).  Few countries tax capital gains (the U.S. 
excludes the first $500,000 in gain), and, while a few European countries tax imputed rents (the U.S. does 
not), they are taxed at lower effective rates than private market rents are taxed.  The magnitude of the 
fundamental tax advantage is directly related to the levels of both nominal pretax asset returns in the 
economy and household marginal income tax rates.  The higher the level of returns and/or tax rates, the more 
valuable is the low taxation of the returns on owner-occupied housing.  Because the tax advantage increases 
as the marginal tax bracket of the household increases, the demand for owner-occupied housing is greater the 
higher the tax bracket of the household (holding after-tax income constant).  The housing tax advantage is 
clearly less in countries with flat (low) tax rate schedules. 
In the quarter century after 1938, the UK sharply reduced the relative taxation of equity-financed 
owner-occupied housing.
2  When income taxation was reintroduced in 1842, imputed rent was set equal to an 
assessed value, which equalled an estimate of market rate and was taxed under ‘Schedule A’ of the income 
tax system, and mortgage interest (all household interest payments) was fully deductible (Hills, 1991).  
Reassessments were made every five years until 1935.  By 1961, when the next reassessment was 
undertaken, imputed rent had been eroded by inflation to only a third of market rent.  In 1963 the 
Conservative Government abolished taxation of imputed rents altogether, increasing and making permanent 
the low taxation of this component of return.  The tax advantage to the capital gains component of return 
commenced when the capital gains tax, introduced in 1965, exempted gains on owner-occupied housing. 
The deductibility of home mortgage interest is a means of extending the fundamental tax advantage 
of owner-occupied housing, the low taxation of the return on equity invested in housing, to the numerous 
younger, less wealthy households who cannot finance their purchase entirely with equity.  Most developed 
                                                           
2 During the 1980s the UK and many other countries sharply increased the relative taxation of equity-
financed owner-occupied housing by significantly cutting the tax rates applied to other capital income.  
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countries allow a mortgage interest deduction, although many European countries limit it to a fixed amount 
or allow the deduction to be taken only at a tax rate less than that of many household marginal rates.   In 
contrast, the Commonwealth countries -- Australia, Canada, New Zealand and now the UK – do not allow 
this interest deduction. 
In fact, interest has never been fully deductible in the U.S.  Low income households or households 
with low mortgage debt living in states with low house prices and low taxation (state taxes and mortgage 
interest are the two largest deductible expenses) would select not to itemize expenses because taking the 
standard deduction would lower their taxes (Ling and McGill, 1998).  Further, even if a household did 
itemize, not all mortgage interest was effectively deductible (the amount of interest that raised total 
deductible expenses to the standard deduction was “wasted”).  The amount of wasted interest (and the 
number of households that chose not to itemize) grew following the 1986 tax act for two reasons 
(Hendershott, Follain and Ling, 1987).  First, a number of expenses that were previously deductible could no 
longer be itemized, probably the most important being the interest on consumer credit debt.  Second, the 
standard deduction was sharply increased.  The 1986 act also phased out itemized deductions when 
household income rose above threshold levels, limiting deductibility for very high income households to as 
little as 20 percent of their interest paid. 
Follain, Ling, and various associates have used the change in the effective deductibility of mortgage 
interest induced by the 1986 tax act to test the hypothesis that household leverage is sensitive to the tax 
penalty associated with debt (Follain and Ling, 1991, Ling and McGill, 1998, Follain and Dunsky, 1997, and 
Dunsky and Follain, 2000).  In each case, the leverage of individual households was found to be related 
significantly to the effective deductibility of mortgage interest.  This work, which requires forecasting 
various unavailable household expenses and determining whether households would select to itemize or take 
the standard deduction, is innovative indeed.  Using the Dunsky and Follain estimates, Follain and Melamed 
(1998) built a simulation model and predicted that removal of the mortgage interest deduction would lower 
mortgage debt by 41 percent.  
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The 41 percent estimate is roughly consistent with the aggregate comparison between Australia (AU) 
and the U.S. made by Capozza, Green and Hendershott (1996).  They relate the LTVs of nearly 12,000 U.S. 
households in the 1989 Survey of Current Finances to the age of the household head and the log of income.  
This mimics the LTV estimates of Bourassa and Hendershott (1994) for just over 4,000 Australian 
households in 1986.  Because interest is not deductible in Australia and is in the U.S., one would expect that 
the LTVs would be lower at all ages in Australia than in the U.S., and they are.  The predicted U.S. (and AU 
in parentheses) LTVs for households of ages 25-29, 40-44, and 55-59 are 0.56 (0.42), 0.34 (0.12) and 0.16 
(0.01). 
Mortgage interest in the UK was fully deductible until 1974.  At that time, a £25,000 ceiling was 
introduced on the size of mortgage eligible for interest deductibility.  Given that the mean house price was 
£10,000, this ceiling affected few households.  But because the ceiling was not indexed, it became 
progressively more binding over time as nominal house prices rose, and by 1990 it affected half of purchase 
loan originations.  In addition, in 1993 the tax rate at which interest on debt below the ceiling could be 
deducted was lowered below the maximum rate at which income was taxed.  In 1999 this rate was lowered to 
zero; deductibility was thus eliminated altogether. 
The 1988-98 period of gradual removal, where households faced substantially different degrees of 
deductibility, is an ideal period to study the sensitivity of homeowner leverage to the deductibility of interest 
and to draw some inferences about the likely impact of the removal of interest deductibility on debt usage 
and the weighted average cost of capital for owner-occupied housing.  Such is the goal of the present paper. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections and a conclusion/summary.  We first derive 
debt tax penalty variables and present our estimation strategy.  We then describe our database, including how 
we deal with credit rationing.  Finally, we report our results based upon 1988-91 and 1995-98 loan samples. 
 
The Debt Tax Penalty and Form of the Estimation Equations 
As noted above, mortgage interest deductibility is a means of extending the fundamental tax 
advantage of owner-occupied housing to households who use debt finance.  Deductibility does not   
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make debt cheaper than equity, rather it maintains tax equality between the two costs. Thus to the  
extent that the deduction is limited, there is a tax cost or penalty to using debt and usage should be less. 
 
Measurement of the Tax Penalty on Debt 
  This argument can be formalized in the following way.  In general, the weighted average cost of 
capital for owner-occupied housing is just an average of the debt (CD) and equity (CE) costs where the 
weights are the loan to value ratio, LTV, and 1-LTV: 
 WACC  =  LTV(CD)  +  (1-LTV)(CE).        (1) 
If the costs, CD and CE, both equal the after-tax interest rate, (1-t)i, then WACC = (1-t)i (we abstract from 
risk premia).  However, if a tax penalty (pen) is imposed on debt usage, its cost is (1-t+pen)i and 
 WACC  =  (1-t)i  +  LTV(pen)i.         (2) 
If the penalty is the nondeductibility of interest, pen = t and the WACC is increased by the product LTVti. 
How much the imposition of the tax penalty raises the WACC depends on how much households 
change LTV in response to the loss of deductibility.  The more households reduce LTV, the less the cost is 
increased and thus the less will be the reduction in homeownership and housing demand.  (Also, the less 
revenue the government will gain by imposing the tax penalty.)  Estimating the LTV response is the primary 
purpose of this paper. 
During the last quarter century, the mortgage interest deduction in the UK has been limited in two 
ways.  First, in 1974 the deduction was restricted to that on a £25,000 mortgage (and the deductibility of 
interest on other household debt was eliminated).  In 1983, the limit was raised to £30,000; the median UK 
house price level had nearly tripled to £29,400 since 1974.  Subsequently the limit was never again raised in 
spite of rising house prices (the median tripled again to £87,300 in 1999).  As can be seen in Table 1A, by 
1988-91 about half of the new mortgage originations were above the limit and by 1995-98 two-thirds were.  
Second, the maximum tax rate at which interest could be deducted was cut from the 40 percent maximum 
income tax rate to 25 percent in 1992, to 20 percent in 1994, to 10 percent in 1995, and finally to zero in 
1999.  Given that there were only two household income tax brackets during this period, 25 and 40 percent,  
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after 1993 no household paying taxes could deduct mortgage interest at their full marginal income tax rate 
(see Table 1B). 
Of the ceiling and tax rate maximums, the former has been far more important for new borrowers 
who have reasonably high initial loan-to-value ratios (the average of our sample is about 0.75).  With a 
median house price in 1995-98 of £60,000 to £70,000 outside the London/Southeast area and £85,000 to 
£115,000 in London and the Southeast, most households had initial loans above the £30,000 mortgage limit 
and thus could not deduct interest at the margin. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the debt tax penalty varies with loan size.  Tax rates are on the vertical axis 
and loan amount on the horizontal.  The top line is a household’s marginal tax rate.  Holding house value 
constant, the larger is the mortgage loan, the more interest is deductible (unless the loan is above the ceiling, 
Lc), but the larger are the household’s taxable investments and thus the higher is its taxable interest income.  
As long as the ceiling isn’t binding, taxable income is at least roughly independent of loan size.  But when 
the loan exceeds the ceiling, the larger is the loan (and thus taxable investments), the higher is the 
household’s taxable income.  At some point the household could be pushed into a higher tax bracket, as the 
shift from t1 to t2 illustrates. 
 
        Figure 1: The Tax Penalty Variable 
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The dashed tt line in the figure indicates the lower maximum tax rate introduced in 1993 at which 
mortgage interest on the loan amount below the ceiling can be deducted.  Of course, interest on the loan 
above the ceiling is deductible at a zero rate.  To summarize then, the tax penalty on loans above the ceiling 
is the full tax rate, t; the penalty below the ceiling is the maximum of t-tt or zero (the latter for households 
with t < tt).  Before 1993, there was no penalty on loans below the ceiling. 
Thus two tax penalty variables are needed to reflect possible UK limitations on interest deductibility.  
The first captures the nondeductibility of interest on loans above the loan ceiling and is measured as the 
product of the tax rate and the market interest rate.  The second captures the effect of the lower tax rate at 
which interest below the ceiling is deductible after 1992 and is measured as the product of max(t-tt, 0) and 
the market interest rate. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
To disentangle the characteristics of borrowers that have loans above the ceiling from characteristics 
that are caused by being above the ceiling, we first estimate a logit equation predicting whether or not the 
borrower’s loan amount exceeds the ceiling and then use the predicted probability that the loan amount 
exceeds the ceiling, rather than whether it actually does, in computation of the tax penalty variables for use in 
the leverage estimation.  This is an attempt to address the simultaneous determination of the tax penalty 
facing the borrower and his/her loan to value ratio.  Although similar variables appear in both the LTV 
regression and the logit, we use different transformation of them in each.  Combined with the non-linearity of 
the logit and the non-linear way in which the predicted probability enters the LTV regression, the incidence 
of multicolinearity between the tax variable and the other variables is minimized.  The plausible signs and 
magnitudes of coefficients, the stability of the regressions and the high t-ratios confirm that multicolinearity 
is not a problem (Greene, 1993, p. 267).  
The logit equation takes the form: 
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CEIL(0/1) = f(income, ageDUMs, previous-owner, regionDUMs, yearDUMs),     (3) 
 
where income and previous owner are both entered separately and interacted with the age dummies (<25, 25-
34, 35-44, 45-54, >54).  Income and age give us a prediction of housing demand by the household; the 
greater this demand, the more likely the loan is to exceed the ceiling.  The impact of previous owner is 
unclear.  On the one hand, a household with equity from a previous house can use this to make a larger down 
payment and thus would be less likely to have a loan above the ceiling.  On the other hand, holding income, 
age, etc. constant, the more equity from a previous house, the larger can be the house one purchases.  The 
regional dummies are introduced to reflect the impact of differences in regional house prices, and the year 
dummies are introduced to capture the variation in the level of house prices across the years of origination.  
The higher are house prices, the more likely is the ceiling to bind.  Two equations are estimated, one for loan 
originations in “low” house price regions and another for those in “high” house price regions (see the data 
section). 
The leverage estimation equation is: 
 
lnLTV = g[basic determinants] - γ  tiprob - β   max(t-tt,0)i(1-prob)    (4) 
 
where prob is the predicted probability of having a loan above the ceiling.  We allow for the tax penalty 
responses, γ  and β , to vary with the borrower’s age.  We denote the first tax penalty variable by T_above and 
the second by T_below.  
The household tax rate used in this estimation, t, must be independent of LTV.  We compute the tax 
rate on the first dollar of housing finance (opportunity cost of own equity invested unless the house is 100 
percent debt financed) by adding an estimate of the income the household would have earned on the equity  
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invested in the house, i(HOUS-LOAN), to reported income.  Given a progressive tax system, this is the 




We use the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) 5% random sample of mortgage loan origination 
data, which has 20,000 to 40,000 loans per year.  The underlying database contains all loans originated by 
commercial banks, building societies and others.  The data have been collected annually since 1974.  The key 
variables included in the CML data set are: 
1. mortgage  data: date, amount, type, initial rate, maturity, amortization pattern, and type of advance 
(whether new mortgage, re-mortgage, further advance, or top-up loan). 
2. dwelling  data: purchase price, location of house, and dwelling characteristics  
3. borrower  data: number, income and age of borrowers; previous tenure of main borrower. 
A wide variety of mortgages exist in the UK, with product varying by repayment (standard, interest-
only and endowment), term, and adjustment period.  The major types of repayment are interest-only, fully 
amortizing, and endowment.  The endowment mortgage is interest only, but the homeowner purchases a life 
insurance policy with a constant monthly premium that presumably will cover repayment at the end of the 
mortgage.
4  The adjustment periods are monthly or fixed for various lengths.  We have much detail on the 
1995-98 loans, but less for 1988-91.  Between the periods, the mean mortgage term fell from 23.4 to 20.5 
years.  The percentage of loans that were fully amortizing rose from 17 to 40 percent and interest-only 
increased from less than 4 to 19 percent.  Endowment loans, on the other hand, fell from 62 to 37 percent.  In 
1995-98, two thirds of the loans were fully variable, while few were fixed for as long as five years. 
                                                           
3 The Institute for Fiscal Studies at Cambridge University has the UK tax rules back to 1973 posted on its 
web site (www.ifs.org.uk).  This information is used to compute the t’s for our households. 
4 See Devereux and Lanot (2001) for an analysis of household choice between endowment and other 
mortgages.  
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We analyze new mortgage data (mortgages to finance house purchases) from 1988-91 and 1995-98.
5  
By dealing with house purchasers, we avoid the problems of controlling for or estimating how long it will 
take existing owners to adjust their leverage level in response to changes in interest deductibility (Ling and 
McGill, 1998).  The two time periods differ both in levels of house price (percent of loans over £30,000) and 
in the debt tax penalty.  During 1995-98, mortgage interest on loans below the £30,000 ceiling was 
deductible at the 10 percent rate (t*=0.1), rather than the marginal income tax rate of most households.  Thus 
the tax rate penalty was either 0.3 or 0.15 for households with loans below the ceiling versus 0.4 or 0.25 for 
households above the ceiling.  During the 1988-91 period, the tax penalty varied from zero for households 
with loan size less than the ceiling to the highest marginal tax rate of households with loan size greater than 
the ceiling.  Given that the tax penalty was less dependent on whether one is above or below the ceiling in 
1995-98 than in 1988-91, estimates from the latter period will be less dependent on the accuracy of the 
estimated logit than estimates from the earlier period. 
Figure 2 plots constant-quality UK house prices for 10 regions over the period 1980 to 1998.  Prices 
grew steadily (nearly 10 percent per annum) during the 1970s and 1980s and were relatively flat during the 
1990s.
6  At all times prices in London and the Southeast are significantly greater than those in the rest of the 
UK, and during the late 1980s prices in the Southwest and East Angelica were also relatively high. Loans 
from these four areas are designated the high price group and loans from the other regions are labelled the 
low price group during the 1988-91 period.  Only London and the Southeast are classified as high house 
price areas during the 1995-98 period.  Because households in high house price areas are far more likely to 
have loans above the £30,000 ceiling, we estimate separate logit equations for data in the high and low price 
                                                           
5 In 1988 the deductibility of interest on loans for renovation was eliminated, as was the ability of both 
members of an unmarried couple to deduct interest on loans of up to £30,000 (removing a then existing 
“marriage tax penalty” by increasing the tax on non-marrieds).  Prior to 1988 it is difficult to determine 
whether a multiple-adult household faced a £30,000 or £60,000 fully deductible ceiling. 
6 The movement in real house prices is substantially different.  In particular, real prices cycled sharply during 
the 1972-76 and 1985-93 periods and otherwise grew at a fairly steady 2.5 percent between 1970 and 1997.  
This 2.5 percent barely exceeds the two percent drift in the U.S. that Hendershott and Thibodeau (1990) 
attribute to new houses being of higher quality than old and old being renovated.  That is, median house price 
inflation exceeds constant-quality house price inflation by two percent annually.  
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areas.  Because we believe it especially important to analyze samples with wide variation in the debt tax 
penalty, we estimate a single equation for each period to explain household LTVs. 
We restrict the data set in a number of ways.  First, to exclude investment properties we delete loans 
to finance houses not occupied by the borrower.  Second, we delete observations owing to missing values for 
some of the variables needed for the logit estimations.  Third, we eliminate borrowers who are deemed likely 
to have had their borrowing decision dictated by lender borrowing limits (borrowers who are at/near the 
maximum allowable loan-to-value and/or loan-to-income ratios).  Constrained borrowers are unlikely to be 
able to respond to the tax penalty. 
The deletion of credit-constrained borrowers involves three steps.  First, we identify a clearly 
unconstrained subset of borrowers.  Second, we estimate housing demand functions for these households.  
Third, we predict housing demand for the rest of the sample (the possibly constrained borrowers).  Borrowers 
with demand equal to or greater than that predicted are defined as unconstrained and added to the clearly 
unconstrained to form our total sample.  Sample selection effects were captured using the Heckman 
estimation procedure.  Here we discuss how the clearly unconstrained subset was identified.  The housing 
demand estimation is contained in the Appendix. 
Figures 3 and 4 contain the distributions of loans by LTV between zero and unity (the top half) and 
then between 0.8 and 1.0 (the bottom half) in our 1988-91 and 1995-98 samples (high and low priced regions 
are similar).   The concentration of borrowers at the 90 and especially 95 and 100 percent values in the earlier 
period is obvious.  This reflects both the increase in borrowing costs (required default insurance contracts) as 
those values are exceeded and, for the 100 percent concentration for sure, the maximum loan that lenders will 
make.  The deregulation of financial institutions in the early 1980s had a major impact.  In 1979, less than 
four percent of loans with LTVs above 80 percent had LTVs over 95 percent and only 20 percent had loans 
over 90 percent.  In our full database, over a quarter of such loans had LTVs over 95 percent and two-thirds 
had them above 90 percent. 
Figure 4 suggests a tightening of the LTV maximum in the middle 1990s; very few loans with LTV 
above 95 percent were originated in the 1995-98 period, while 15 percent of 1988-91 loans had LTVs of 100  
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percent.  Nonetheless, in the later period 75 percent of loan originations had LTVs above 80%, versus only 
57 percent in the 1988-91 period.  That is, while there was a sharp reduction in 100% loans, credit was still 
amply available. 
Figure 5 gives the distributions of the sample with ratios of loan size to income between 1.5 and 3.5 
for single earner households in 1988-91 (top half) and 1995-98 (bottom half).  The distributions for high and 
low house price areas are similar.  As can be seen, the distribution falls off sharply after 3.0 in the first period 
but remains high until 3.25 in the second.  It appears that lending standards were loosened between the two 
periods.  Figure 6 gives the distributions for the loan-to-income ratio between 1.5 and 3.5 for multiple earner 
households in 1988-91 (top half) and 1995-98 (bottom half).  In both periods the distribution drops off 
abruptly at 2.5, although significant numbers of borrowers obtain ratios up to 3.0 and some have ratios far 
above 3.0. 
The “certainly unconstrained” borrowers in our sample are defined as those with LTVs below 0.89 
and acceptable loan-to-income ratios.  Based upon the above analysis, different loan-to-income constraints 
were applied for single and multiple earner households.  In 1988-91 we restrict the sample to loan-to-income 
ratios below 2.75 (single earners) and 2.4 (multiple earners).  In 1995-98 we increase the limit for single 
earners to 2.9, but maintain the 2.4 for multiple earners. 
Table 2 presents summary data on our samples and how they have been produced.  For each of the 
two house price groups for the two time periods we report both the number of loans we define as certainly 
unconstrained and the additional number we estimate to be unconstrained.  As can be seen, we drop roughly 
45 percent of the sample as we move from the logit estimation to the LTV estimation.  For the unconstrained 
borrowers we list the percent (1) with loans above the £30,000 ceiling, (2) made to previous owners, and (3) 
made to multiple-earner households, as well as the percentage distribution by age class. 
Not surprisingly, the percentage of loans exceeding the £30,000 ceiling is greater in high than low 
price areas and in 1995-98 (especially in low price areas) than in 1988-91.  The age distribution of borrowers 
is similar in high and low price areas, but shifts significantly over time with the share of loans to under age 
25 borrowers falling and that to ages 35-44 rising between 1988-91 and 1995-98.  In both low and high  
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house price regions, the share of loans to under age 25 borrowers was 12 percent in 1988-91.  By 1995-98 
this share was only nine (low price) and five (high price) percent.  This shift at least partially reflects the 
ageing of the baby-boomers.  The percentage of loans to previous owners in low price areas fell by five 
percentage points, while that in high price areas rose by four percentage points.  The latter is consistent with 




  Table 3 reports the fit and the estimates of the logit predicting whether a borrower’s loan is above or 
below the £30,000 limit.  As can be seen, 78 and 82 percent of the sample, respectively, are predicted 
correctly in the low and high price areas.  The distributions of the predicted probability of being over the 
ceiling and of the associated tax penalty variable are shown in Figure 7.  The predicted probability 
distribution is flat through about 0.7 and then rises shapely.  The rise reflects the high level of nominal house 
prices in the Southeast regions.  The variation in the predicted tax penalty variable is large.  While the 
variable is less than 0.03 for over two-thirds of the sample, it ranges from 0.045 to 0.06 for a quarter of the 
sample. 
  Table 4 reports the regressions of lnLTV.  The adjusted R2 is 0.29.  The key coefficient is, of course, 
that on the tax penalty variable, T_above.  This coefficient is –6.4 with a t-ratio of 29.  For high tax rate 
(40%) households with a loan over £30,000, and thus paying a tax penalty, lnLTV is reduced by –6.4(.12)(.4) 
= -0.294. For low tax rate (25%) households, the reduction is -6.4(.12)(.25) = -0.192.  Assuming an LTV of 
0.85 in the absence of the penalty, the LTV would be 0.63 to 0.70 with the penalty.   If the LTV were 0.65 in 
the absence of the penalty, the LTV would be 0.48 to 0.54 with the penalty.  That is, leverage would be 
reduced by 17 (low tax bracket borrowers) to 26 (high tax bracket borrowers) percent. 
The elasticities of LTV with respect to primary income and secondary income (income is measured 
in thousands), respectively, are 0.275 and 0.068.  Higher income households demand larger houses and  
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choose to finance them with relatively greater leverage.
7  The lower leverage elasticity with respect to second 
incomes likely reflects the ability of households with second incomes to obtain down payment support from 
two families rather than one (we do not know if the individuals in the household are married).  Previous 
ownership also reduces leverage, although much less for younger households.  For households over age 34, 
the reduction in lnLTV is 0.28.  For under age 25 households, the reduction is 0.09. 
  Table 5 reports some calculations indicating the predicted variation in LTVs across three age groups 
(25 to 34, 45 to 54, and 55 plus) with average single incomes for their age class, with and without a 
secondary earner with average income, and separately for first-time and previous owners.  The calculations 
are for the dropped year (1991) and region (London) and assume no debt tax penalty.  The first two rows 
give background data on mean incomes of first and second earners for the age groups.  The next three 
(numbered) rows give the log of these mean incomes and mean LTVs.  Incomes rise from ages 25-34 to ages 
45-54 and then decline for those over age 55.  
LTVs decline sharply with age, 30 to 35 percentage points as age increases from 25-34 to over 55.  
This is the type of decline commonly seen in developed economies, but note that this decline is for new 
purchases, not for homeowners generally.  The predicted LTVs based on the mean income levels are four 
(over age 55) to ten (25 to 34) percentage points higher for multiple earner households than for single earner 
households.  Finally, the LTV is about 10 percentage points lower for previous owners. 
 
1995-98 
  The basic logits and lnLTV results are in Tables 6 and 7.  Whether a borrower’s loan is above or 
below the £30,000 ceiling is correctly predicted by the logit 83 to 86 percent of the time.  Figures 8 and 9, 
respectively, plot the distributions of the predicted probability of being over the ceiling and of the associated 
tax penalty variables T_above and T_below.  Owing to the rise in nominal house prices, the probability 
distribution is now strongly skewed to the right.  Half of the sample has a probability greater than 0.8.  The 
                                                           
7 On the other hand, the existence of a second earner in the household reduces leverage (lnLTV is lowered by 
0.48).  The level of second income at which leverage is unaffected is obtained by solving 0.48 = 
ln(INCL)*0.068.  The solution is £1095; for second incomes below this level, leverage declines.  
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tax penalty variables generally have lower values because the level of interest rates declined from 0.12 to 
0.07.  The right skewness of the probability of being over the ceiling results in a right skewness in T_above 
and a left skewness in T-below. 
The adjusted R2 for the lnLTV regressions is 0.31.  The previous owner results are similar to those 
for 1988-91, but the income variables have considerably smaller effects and age coefficients are smaller.  
This is illustrated by the calculations in Table 8, which assume no penalty and are based on London and 
1998.  The simulated declines from age 25-34 to 55+ are 23 percentage points for previous owners and 17 
percentage points for nonowners, 10 to 15 points less than those in Table 5. 
But the actual decline from age 25-34 to 55+ in the 1995-98 data was 0.32, greater than the 0.20 
decline based on the 1988-91 data.  This greater decline is due to the more widespread tax penalty on the use 
of home mortgage debt – a penalty that existed whether one’s loan was above or below the £30,000 ceiling – 
and a larger estimated response to it.  The two tax penalty coefficients in the first column of Table 7 are both 
statistically significant with the expected negative sign.  The response to the penalty when above the ceiling, 
T_above, is more than double that in the 1988-91 period, -14.1 with t-ratio of 29, versus -6.4.  The response 
when below the ceiling is much larger, -62.7 with a t-ratio of 41. 
Because of the multiple tax-penalty coefficients, the interpretation of the tax penalty variables is 
more complicated.  Above the ceiling, the penalty is t, below the ceiling it is t-0.1 (both times i = 0.07).  For 
households in the 40 percent tax bracket, the lnLTV response to removal of interest deductibility is either 
-62.7(.07)(.3) – below the ceiling – or -14.1(.07)(.4) – above the ceiling, i.e., -1.62 or -0.39.  For households 
in the 25 percent tax bracket, the estimated response is either –62.7(.07)(.15) or -14.1(.07)(.25), i.e., -0.66 or 
-0.25.  That is, the response (reduction in lnLTV) is 2.5 to 4 times as great for those below the ceiling than 
those above.  Given that loans below the ceiling are smaller (a half to a fifth on average), the percentage 
declines can be achieved with far smaller loan payoffs. 
One possible reason for the larger responses to T_above in 1995-98 than in 1988-91 (-14.1 versus 
-6.4) is the decline in importance of under age 35 borrowers in the sample noted in Table 2 (from 54 to 48 
percent of the sample in low price areas and from 53 to 42 percent in high price areas).  If older households  
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with greater wealth are more sensitive to the tax penalty, we would expect the average sample response to 
increase as the sample ages.  To test the hypothesis that older households are more responsive, we run a 
regression with each tax penalty variable entered both by itself and times a dummy variable equaling one for 
households over age 34 and zero for younger households.  The results are in Table 9.  These interaction 
variables, as well as the tax penalty variables themselves are expected to have negative coefficients.  The 
four coefficients are large, negative, and have t-ratios ranging from 7 to 29.
8 
Table 10 reports the impacts of removing the deductibility of mortgage interest for borrowers under 
age 35 and 35 and older and with loans above and below £30,000.  The tax variable coefficients and t-ratios 
are in the first two rows of the table, and row 3 gives the cumulative coefficients (“all” for under age 35 and 
the sum of the “all” and “over 34” coefficients for over age 34).  The first two columns are for loans over 
£30,000 and the third and fourth for under £30,000.  Rows 4-7 report the distribution of households and 
average loan amounts for these household groups separately by low (largely 25 percent) and high (40 
percent) tax brackets.  Note that high tax bracket households are disproportionately older – they are almost 
twice as likely to be over age 34, while low tax bracket households are more likely to be under age 35 – and 
that the average loan size of high tax bracket households with loans over £30,000 is nearly twice that of low 
tax bracket households.   Because high tax bracket and older households respond more than low tax bracket 
and younger households, this increases the aggregate response to removal of deductibility. 
The impacts of removing deductibility are computed in two ways.  First, we shift the probability of 
being over the £30,000 ceiling from zero to one, i.e., we use the coefficients from the first two columns.  
Second, we shift the probability of being under the ceiling from zero to one, using the much larger 
coefficients from the second two columns.  The percentage reduction in leverage from removal of 
deductibility is (1 – e
pen)*100, where pen is the product of the tax variable coefficient, the interest rate (0.07), 
and either the tax rate (loans over £30,000) or the tax rate less 0.1 (loans below £30,000).  For those with 
loans above the £30,000 ceiling the reduction ranges from 19 to 29 percent for those under age 35 and from 
                                                           
8 The age interaction tax penalty variable was tested with the 1988-91 subsample, but its coefficient was 
insignificantly different from zero.  For 1995-98, an under age 25 interaction was tested in addition to the 
over age 34 interaction.  The under age 25 coefficients were positive, as expected, but small.  
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23 to 34 percent for those 35 and older.  These percentage declines are, on average, about the same as the 17 
to 26 percent declines based on the 1988-91 sample, even though the level of interest rates was only 7 
percent in 1995-98 versus the 12 percent in 1988-91 and thus the tax penalty was less. 
The declines in leverage for those with loans less than the ceiling (columns three and four) are much 
larger, 40 to 65 percent for young households and 53 to 78 for older households.  Given that we are dealing 
here with smaller volume loans, the percentage declines can be achieved with smaller loan payoffs.  The 
larger responses are because the greater estimated response to the tax penalty outweighs the smaller penalty 
(the tax rate less 0.1, rather than the full tax rate).  Of course the fact that these loans are small means that 
even these large responses are not very important to the aggregate response.  In fact, the weighted average 
LTV response for the eight household groups is a 30 percent decline. 
  How much government tax revenue would be gained by elimination of tax deductibility depends on 
who (high or low tax rate payers) is repaying the debt, as well as how much is repaid.  Say that the “static” 
(no behavioral responses) estimate of the revenue lost owing to deductibility is £10 billion and that mortgage 
debt declines by 30 percent in response to the removal of deductibility.  The government revenue pickup will 
be significantly less than £7 billion because high tax bracket households would repay relatively more debt 
than low tax bracket households.   Not only do higher tax bracket households respond about twice as much 
because their tax penalty is greater, but higher tax bracket households have loans that are almost twice as 
large.  The response of older households with the same tax penalty is about 20 percent greater than that of 
younger households, probably owing to their having greater wealth relative to income. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
  We analyze over 117,000 UK loan originations split about equally between the 1988-91 and 1995-98 
periods.  Because the tax penalty to using debt varied during these periods with whether a borrower had a 
loan above or below £30,000, we first estimate logit equations explaining whether the loan exceeded £30,000 
and then use the predicted probability of the borrower’s loan exceeding this amount in computing our two tax 
penalty variables.  The variables represent the penalty per unit of debt if the loan is above £30,000 – the  
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product of the tax rate and the interest rate – or below – the product of the interest rate and the difference 
between one’s marginal income tax rate and the rate at which mortgage interest is deductible. 
  We establish a major sensitivity of leverage to the debt tax penalty created for many households (for 
all during the 1995-98 period) by the partial deductibility of mortgage interest.  This sensitivity exists for 
both time periods.  Based on this, we can infer what the impact of removing the interest deduction would be 
relative to having the full deduction.  Because estimates for the latter period are less sensitive to the accuracy 
of the logits used in computing the tax penalty variables, we view them as more credible.  Our best estimate 
is that leverage of those with loans over £30,000 would decline by 19 to 34 percent, the larger percentage 
applying to older (over age 34) borrowers in the 40 percent tax bracket.  For those with smaller loans (under 
the £30,000 ceiling), the estimates are far larger – a 40 to 78 percent decline.  Because 80 percent of loans 
are above £30,000, the aggregate decline would be about 30 percent. 
    Our analysis is based on new loans for home purchase.  Homeowners with existing loans will also 
pay down their loans.  Because these households are older and many will have smaller loans, they are likely 
to be more sensitive to removal of the mortgage interest deduction (although effective prepayment penalties 
would make this response less/slower in the UK than in the U.S.).  On the other hand, we have excluded 45 
percent of new loans on the grounds that the borrowers may have been income or wealth constrained.  These 
borrowers would be less sensitive to the tax penalty than unconstrained borrowers.  Overall, our estimates of 
a reduction in the average UK leverage suggest a smaller – say 25 to 30 percent response than the 40 percent 
found in earlier studies of Australia and U.S. data.   
  The tax revenue gained by the government from removal of the home mortgage interest deduction 
will be less than the product of the average tax rate at which interest is deducted and the amount of debt not 
repaid for a variety of reasons.  First, the average tax rate will decline because high tax bracket households 
will repay disproportionately larger fractions of their debt owing to their having a larger tax penalty and 
having greater relative wealth to repay debt.  Second, removal of deductibility will lower the volume of 
single-family housing to be financed by raising the weighted average user cost of capital (WACC), although 
the debt response mitigates the rise in WACC, our concluding topic.  
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  Initially assume full deductibility, a mortgage rate of 8 percent and an after-tax risk premium of one 
percent.  Consider two households, one in the 40 percent tax bracket and the other in the 25 percent bracket.  
Their WACCs – (1-t)8 + 1 – are, respectively, 5.8 and 7 percent.  Without deductibility, their WACCs rise to 
(1-t)8 + 1 + LTVt8.  Table 11 gives the WACC for these households assuming alternative initial LTVs – 0.9 
and 0.7 – and alternative percentage declines in leverage in response to the removal of interest deductibility – 
20, 30 and 40. 
  Of course, with no decline in LTV, the increases are the largest, being greater the higher the initial 
LTV.  The percentage decline in LTV acts as a direct offset to the percentage increase in WACC – if LTV 
declines by 30 percent, the increase in the WACC is only 70 percent of what it otherwise would have been.  
Consider the 0.9 LTV.  With no change in leverage, removal of the deduction increases the WACC by 1.8 to 
2.9 percentage points or 26 to 50 percent (the larger numbers for households in the 40 percent tax bracket).   
With a 30 percent decline in leverage, the increase in the WACC is reduced by 30 percent or a half to a full 
percentage point. 
  Changes in household leverage would significantly offset the negative impact of the removal of 
interest deductibility on house prices, housing consumption and home ownership.  To illustrate, consider the 
extreme case where all of the increase in WACC causes a reduction in housing consumption.  In the 
appendix we estimate that the elasticity of housing demand with respect to the WACC is –0.25 to –0.4.  Thus 
if the WACC rises by 30 percent, the decline in housing consumption would be 7.5 to 12 percent.  On the 
other hand, if leverage adjustments offset half of the rise in WACC, the decline in consumption would be 
only 4 to 6 percent. 
  At the other extreme, the rise in WACC could simply lower real house prices.  In this case, a 30 
percent rise in the WACC translates directly into a 30 percent price decline.  Thus a halving of the increase in 
WACC would half the price decline.  A mixture of consumption and price declines would be expected, but 
the declines would, according to our estimates, by reduced by about a third by the leverage response.  
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Appendix: Determining Credit Constrained Borrowers 
 
The LTV functions were estimated using a five-step procedure applied separately to each time 
period.  The last two steps were discussed in detail in the text and so it is the first three steps, relating to the 
treatment of rationed borrowers, that is our focus here.  Before detailing each step, it is worth summarizing 
the overall strategy.  The goal is to develop a methodology for identifying unrationed borrowers. We first 
specified a subsample of borrowers who we believe to be clearly unrationed given their loan-to-value and 
loan-to-income ratios. We then estimated a housing demand function for this group of borrowers and used 
this function to estimate the demand for each household in the rest of the sample and compared it to their 
actual demand. If actual demand equaled or exceeded predicted demand, the household was added to our 
unrationed sample, on which our final LTV function was estimated.  Sample selection effects were captured 
using the Heckman estimation procedure.  This method translates into a five step procedure. 
Step 1: Estimate ψ bt 
ψ bt is the predicted probability that the borrower’s loan will be less than or equal to the £30,000 
ceiling on tax deductibility. This probability is needed in the construction of the user cost of capital variable 
in the demand regressions estimated in step 2. 
   ψ bt was estimated by running logits (dependent variable = whether or not the borrowers loan 
exceeded the £30,000 limit) on a subsample of clearly unrationed borrowers, selected as those borrowers in 
the 1988-91 (1995-98) period with a loan to value ratio less than or equal to 0.89 (0.89) and either a loan to 
primary earner income ratio less than or equal to 2.75 (2.9) or a loan to total income ratio less than or equal 
to 2.4 (2.4). This resulted in a basic sample of unrationed borrowers in 1988-91 (1995-98) of 44,506 
(38,836).  Separate logits were run for low and high house price regions.  
Step 2: Estimate unconstrained housing consumption 
The housing demand equation followed Hendershott and Pryce (2002), 
 




where lnHC is the log of housing consumption, lnMCH is the log of the marginal cost of housing, lnYb is the 
log of total income, AGE is the age of the main borrower, lnYb is the log of total income, the β i are the 
estimated coefficients, and the subscript b refers to household b.  We adopt Goodman and Kawai’s (1982) 
method for calculating HC, defining it as the actual household house price (times a constant imputed rental 
rate that is absorbed in the constant term when logs are taken) divided by the constant-quality price.  The 
latter is estimated using hedonic regressions of price on housing attributes and quarter dummies, run 
separately for each of the ten regions and each year. 
The marginal cost of housing was calculated as, MCHt = UCCt(P ˆ
rt /RPIt), where RPI is monthly 
retail price index, and UCC is the user cost of capital, defined as the mortgage interest rate i, less the tax 
deductible component τ , plus the rate of depreciation (assumed to be 0.01 for all households), plus property 




UCC  = (1 - τ bt)it + 0.03 - 0.3π
*
rt.  
The expected rate of nominal house price change, π
 *
rt, was estimated separately for each region 
using the backward-looking expectations approach of Ermisch, Findlay and Gibb (1996).  That is, ∆ P ˆ
rt was 
regressed on ∆ P ˆ
rt-1 from 1979 quarter one through to 1998 quarter four, where ∆ P ˆ
rt is the four quarter 
difference in the price index, ∆ P ˆ
rt = P ˆ
rt - P ˆ
rt-4, and the estimated parameters used to forecast expected 
house price inflation for each region in each quarter). 
The constant quality price house price index used for these calculations was constructed using the 
selling price and dwelling characteristics information in the CML Survey of Mortgage Lenders data.  For 
each of the ten regions region, separate regressions were run on selling price for each year of the data since 
1979 (explanatory variables = number of rooms, number of rooms squared, age of dwelling dummies, type of 
dwelling dummies, room-type interactive terms, and quarterly dummies on selling price) thus allowing 
marginal valuations of characteristics to change from year to year.  These regressions (200 in total) had an  
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average adjusted R
2 of 0.48 based on samples of around 1,500 depending on the region and the time period. 
We then predicted value of a constant quality dwelling (a five bedroom, semi-detached, post war dwelling) 
for each region in each quarter = P ˆ
rt.   
A weight of 0.3 was applied to π
 *
rt following Ermisch, Findlay and Gibb (1996).  The tax deductible 
component τ , was computed by multiplying the borrower’s marginal income tax rate Tb by ψ bt, the predicted 
probability that the borrower’s loan would be less than or equal to the £30,000 ceiling on tax deductibility 
(computed in Step 1).  As in the final LTV regressions, the household tax rate used in this estimation, Tb, was 
computed as the tax rate on the first pound of housing purchased by adding an estimate of the income the 
household would have earned on the equity invested in purchasing the house to reported income. 
The housing demand regression was run on the subsample of easily identifiable unrationed 
borrowers and the estimated parameters (listed in Table A) were used to predict unrationed housing demand.  
Missing values reduced the basic unrationed sample in 1988-91 (1995-98) by 3,065 (7,933) observations to 
41,441 (30,903) cases.  The estimated income elasticity is about 0.6 and the price elasticity is –0.25 (1995-
98) to –0.4 (1988-91). 
Step 3: Compare actual and predicted demands for households in the remaining sample 
If actual demand (as recorded in the data) equals or exceeds predicted demand (the antilog of the 
predicted values from the demand regressions in Table A), the household was added to our unrationed 
sample. 
Step 4: Predict the probability of exceeding the ceiling 
The logits were re-run on the enlarged sample and the estimated parameters used to predict the 
probability of exceeding the ceiling.  This probability was used to construct the tax penalty variable in the 
LTV regression. 
Step 5: Run the LTV regression 
  Finally, the LTV regression was run on the expanded unconstrained sample using the Heckman 
procedure to account for selection effects. 
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Table 1:  Limitations of Mortgage Interest Deductibility 
A: Limits on The Amounts Deductible 
 
Year  Limit (£)  Median House Price (£)  % of Mortgages above Limit 
1974 25000  10800  0 
1983 30000  29400  5.4 
1988-91 30000  63000  48.4 
1995-98 30000  73800  67.4 
 
B: Limits on Rate Deductibility 
 
Year  Tax Rate  Max Deductible %  % of Mortgages 
above Max 
1988-91  25, 40  25, 40  ----- 
1992-93 25,  40  25  26 
1994 25,  40  20  100 
1995-98 25,  40  10  100 
1999 23,  40  0  100 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics    





Total Number of mortgages (cases with missing values excluded)  62,522 49,349 
  
Certainly unconstrained  24,762  17,293 
    
Estimated unconstrained  9,827  9,484 
    
Total unconstrained (= Certainly + Estimated = logit sample )  34,589 26,777 
% of Total number of mortgages that are unconstrained  55.32  54.26 
Characteristics of Unconstrained Borrowers:    
% of Total unconstrained with loans over £30,000  47.08  71.86 
% of Total unconstrained who are previous owners  70.93  71.23 
% of Total unconstrained who are multiple earners  45.70  48.96 
% of Total unconstrained aged under 25  12.06  12.27 
% of Total unconstrained aged 25 to 34  41.91  40.71 
% of Total unconstrained aged 35 to 44  25.40  26.02 
% of Total unconstrained aged 45 to 54  12.34  12.92 
% of Total unconstrained aged over 54  8.01  7.79 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics    





Total Number of mortgages (cases with missing values excluded)  64,058 39,830 
  
Certainly unconstrained  23,175  14,277 
    
Estimated unconstrained  14,034  4,488 
    
Total unconstrained (= Certainly + Estimated = logit sample )  37209 18765 
% of Total number of mortgages that are unconstrained   58.09  47.11 
Characteristics of Unconstrained Borrowers:    
% of Total unconstrained with loans over £30,000  74.44 81.20 
% of Total unconstrained who are previous owners  65.92 75.18 
% of Total unconstrained who are multiple earners  48.34 45.60 
% of Total unconstrained aged under 25  8.60 5.05 
% of Total unconstrained aged 25 to 34  39.33 37.14 
% of Total unconstrained aged 35 to 44  27.60 30.25 
% of Total unconstrained aged 45 to 54  15.31 17.14 
% of Total unconstrained aged over 54  9.17 10.42 
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Table 3.  1988-91 
 
Logistic Regression, Probability of being over the ceiling - Low Price Regions 
 




Observed  .00 1.00  
.00 15035 3268 82.1 





Variables in the Equation 
B S.E.  Wald  Sig. 
Previous Owner .190 .057 11.3 .001 
Basic Income .123  .008  253.0  .000 
Other Income .000  .000  760.9  .000 
Other Income Dummy .016  .043  0.1  .713 
AGE < 25 -.020  .191  0.0  .915 
AGE  25-34 .476 .149 10.2 .001 
AGE  35-44 .787 .146 29.0 .000 
AGE 45-54 .453  .159  8.1  .004 
Income Age < 25 .232  .016  215.9  .000 
Income Age 25-34 .145  .010  227.0  .000 
Income  Age35-44 .057 .009 38.6 .000 
Income Age 45-54 .017  .010  2.9  .087 
Prev Owner*Age < 25 -.277  .095  8.4  .004 
Prev Owner*Age 25-34 -.160  .072  4.9  .026 
Yorks&Humber .138 .049  7.8  .005 
East  Midlands .488 .052 88.1 .000 
North  West .226 .049 21.4 .000 
Scotland .042 .053  0.6  .421 
West Midlands .556  .051  119.3  .000 
1988 -.362 .038 89.7 .000 
1989 -.097 .040  5.8  .016 
1990 .007 .041  0.0  .867 
Constant -4.164 .137 921.0 .000 




Logistic Regression, Probability of being over the ceiling - High Price Regions 
 





.00 4073 3463 54.0





Variables in the Equation 
B S.E.  Wald  Sig. 
Previous Owner .203 .057 12.5 .000 
Basic Income .092  .006  236.8  .000 
Other Income .000  .000  340.4  .000 
Other Income Dummy .201  .051  15.3  .000 
AGE < 25 1.585  .190  69.4  .000 
AGE 25-34 1.004  .145  48.0  .000 
AGE  35-44 .626 .134 21.9 .000 
AGE 45-54 .378  .140  7.3  .007 
Income Age < 25 .115  .016  54.6  .000 
Income Age 25-34 .116  .009  161.7  .000 
Income  Age35-44 .066 .008 67.5 .000 
Income Age 45-54 .024  .008  8.9  .003 
Prev Owner*Age < 25 -.047  .124  0.1  .705 
Prev Owner*Age 25-34 -.114  .083  1.9  .168 
South East -.061  .053  1.4  .245 
South West -.142  .056  6.3  .012 
East Anglia -.302  .067  20.2  .000 
1988 .076 .044  2.9  .085 
1989 .237 .052 20.8 .000 
1990 .195 .050 15.1 .000 
Constant -2.909 .120 585.9 .000 
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No. of Observations  61110 
Parameters 25 
Degrees of Freedom  61085 
Adjusted R-squared  0.294 
Model F Test = 1063.20  F Prob value = 0.000 
Log Amemiya PrCrt = -1.758  Akaike Info Crt = 1.080 




Variables in Model 
  Coeff Std  Error t-Stat  P-value 
Constant -3.562  0.053  -67.5  0.000 
Previous Owner  -0.284  0.007  -40.3  0.000 
Basic Income  0.275  0.006  49.8  0.000 
Other Income  0.068  0.003  23.1  0.000 
Other Income Dummy  -0.476  0.025  -18.8  0.000 
Age < 25  0.575  0.010  54.9  0.000 
Age 25-34  0.501  0.009  55.7  0.000 
Age 35-44  0.429  0.007  58.6  0.000 
Age 45-54  0.188  0.008  23.8  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age < 25  0.195  0.012  16.1  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age35-44  0.152  0.009  17.3  0.000 
Yorks&Humber 0.136  0.008  16.1  0.000 
East Midlands  0.125  0.009  14.1  0.000 
North West  0.149  0.008  17.8  0.000 
Scotland 0.201  0.009  22.7  0.000 
West Midlands  0.095  0.009  11.0  0.000 
North 0.184  0.009  19.2  0.000 
South  East  0.004  0.007 0.5 0.626 
South  West  0.069  0.008 8.4 0.000 
East  Anglia  0.070  0.010 6.8 0.000 
1988  0.009  0.005 1.9 0.053 
1989  -0.009  0.005 -1.7 0.079 
1990  0.025  0.005 4.7 0.000 
T_ABOVE -6.383  0.221  -28.8  0.000 
LAMBDA 0.159  0.014  11.6  0.000 
 




Table 5: 1988-91 Predicted Variation in LTV by Age, Number of Earners, 
and whether Previous Owner        25-34        45-54          55+
Mean Single Income 14629 16392 10310
Mean Secondary Income (for those with it) 8332 7255 5863
(1) Mean Log Single Income 9.591 9.705 9.241
(2) Mean log Secondary Income (for those with it) 9.028 8.890 8.677
(3) Mean LTV 0.799 0.641 0.599
Base Case single: lnLTV = -3.56 + (1)*0.275 + Age coefficient 0.501 0.188 0
(4) lnLTV -0.422 -0.703 -1.019
LTV 0.656 0.495 0.361
Previous Owner: lnLTV = (4) + Previous Owner coefficient -0.132 -0.284 -0.284
(5) lnLTV -0.554 -0.987 -1.303
LTV 0.575 0.373 0.272
Base Case multiple: lnLTV = (4) - .176 + (2)*0.068 0.501 0.188 0
(6) lnLTV -0.284 -0.575 -0.905
LTV 0.753 0.563 0.405
Previous Owner: lnLTV = (6) + Previous Owner coefficient -0.132 -0.284 -0.284
lnLTV -0.416 -0.859 -1.189
LTV 0.660 0.424 0.305  7
Table 6.  1995-98 
 
Logistic Regression, Probability of being over the ceiling - Low Price Regions 
 




Observed  .00 1.00  
.00 4821 4689 50.7 






Variables in the Equation 
B S.E.  Wald  Sig. 
Previous Owner -0.250 0.044  32.5  0.000 
Basic  Income 0.129 0.004 973.8 0.000 
Other  Income 0.000 0.000 364.9 0.000 
Other Income Dummy 0.160  0.045  12.4  0.000 
AGE < 25 0.306  0.210  2.1  0.145 
AGE  25-34 1.317 0.119 121.5 0.000 
AGE  35-44 1.492 0.108 191.9 0.000 
AGE 45-54 1.056  0.107  97.6  0.000 
Income Age < 25 0.171  0.018  90.5  0.000 
Income Age 25-34 0.062  0.008  66.4  0.000 
Income Age35-44 -0.002  0.006  0.1  0.801 
Income Age 45-54 -0.037  0.006  42.2  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age < 25 -0.235  0.151  2.4  0.120 
Prev Owner*Age 25-34 0.042  0.071  0.4  0.554 
Yorks&Humber 0.243 0.062  15.4  0.000 
East Midlands 0.127  0.062  4.3  0.039 
North West 0.235  0.061  14.8  0.000 
Scotland 0.144 0.065  5.0  0.026 
West Midlands 0.236  0.062  14.3  0.000 
South West 0.326  0.060  29.1  0.000 
East Anglia 0.120  0.073  2.7  0.099 
1996 -0.080 0.041  3.9  0.050 
1997 -0.064 0.040  2.5  0.112 
1998 -0.125 0.043  8.4  0.004 
Constant -2.761 0.093 881.5 0.000 




Logistic Regression, Probability of being over the ceiling - High Price Regions 
 




Observed  .00 1.00
.00 1469 2059 41.6





Variables in the Equation 
B S.E.  Wald  Sig. 
Previous Owner -0.382 0.066  33.2  0.000 
Basic  Income 0.114 0.005 591.6 0.000 
Other Income 0.000  0.000  98.1  0.000 
Other Income Dummy 0.116  0.068  2.9  0.087 
AGE < 25 0.479  0.400  1.4  0.231 
AGE  25-34 1.811 0.172 111.1 0.000 
AGE  35-44 2.110 0.148 204.4 0.000 
AGE 45-54 0.877  0.147  35.4  0.000 
Income Age < 25 0.120  0.030  16.2  0.000 
Income Age 25-34 -0.012  0.008  2.1  0.144 
Income Age35-44 -0.045  0.007  45.6  0.000 
Income Age 45-54 -0.030  0.007  18.9  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age < 25 -0.933  0.241  15.0  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age 25-34 0.047  0.119  0.2  0.695 
South  East -0.145  0.050 8.5 0.004 
1996 -0.225 0.064  12.5  0.000 
1997 -0.331 0.063  27.8  0.000 
1998 -0.311 0.068  20.7  0.000 
Constant -1.441 0.115 157.2 0.000 
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No. of Observations  55974 
Parameters 26 
Degrees of Freedom  55948 
Adjusted R-squared  0.328 
Model F Test = 1095.59  F Prob value = 0.000 
Log Amemiya PrCrt = -1.754  Akaike Info Crt = 1.084 




Variables in Model 
 Coeff  Std  Error  t-Stat  P-value 
Constant -2.015  0.076  -26.5  0.000 
Previous Owner  -0.335  0.006  -54.1  0.000 
Basic Income  0.196  0.007  26.5  0.000 
Other  Income  0.022  0.003 6.8 0.000 
Other Income Dummy  -0.189  0.029  -6.6  0.000 
AGE < 25  0.226  0.012  18.5  0.000 
AGE 25-34  0.157  0.010  15.4  0.000 
AGE 35-44  0.189  0.008  24.9  0.000 
AGE 45-54  0.070  0.007  10.5  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age < 25  0.112  0.018  6.1  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age 25-34  0.160  0.008  19.0  0.000 
Yorks&Humber 0.167  0.008  20.4  0.000 
East Midlands  0.168  0.008  20.5  0.000 
North West  0.159  0.008  20.0  0.000 
Scotland 0.174  0.008  20.5  0.000 
West Midlands  0.117  0.008  14.4  0.000 
North 0.084  0.008  10.8  0.000 
South East  0.120  0.010  12.2  0.000 
South West  0.191  0.010  19.9  0.000 
East  Anglia  0.026  0.007 4.0 0.000 
1988 -0.108  0.005  -19.7  0.000 
1989 -0.126  0.005  -24.3  0.000 
1990 -0.149  0.005  -27.7  0.000 
T_ABOVE -14.051  0.481  -29.2  0.000 
T_BELOW -62.669  1.543  -40.6  0.000 
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Table 8: 1995-98  Predicted Variation in LTV by Age, Number of Earners
and whether Previous Owner        25-34        45-54          55+
Mean Single Income 19965 25396 17363
Mean Secondary Income (for those with it) 12028 11811 8233
(1) Mean Log Single Income 9.902 10.142 9.762
(2) Mean Log Secondary Income (for those with it) 9.395 9.377 9.016
(3) Mean LTV 0.858 0.652 0.535
(4) Base Case, single (lnLTV=-0.829+(1)*0.062) 0.097 0.184 0
lnLTV -0.118 -0.016 -0.224
LTV 0.889 0.984 0.800
(5) Previous Owner (lnLTV=(4)+ -0.178 -0.347 -0.347
lnLTV -0.296 -0.363 -0.571
LTV 0.744 0.695 0.565
(6) Base Case, multiple (lnLTV=-0.829-0.152+(2)*0.019+(1)*0.062) 0.097 0.184 0
lnLTV -0.092 0.010 -0.204
LTV 0.912 1.010 0.815
(7) Previous Owner (lnLTV=(6)+ -0.178 -0.347 -0.347
lnLTV -0.270 -0.337 -0.551
LTV 0.764 0.714 0.576  11
Table 9.  1995-98  ln LTV Regression including Interactions of the 




No. of Observations  55974 
Parameters 28 
Degrees of Freedom  55946 
Adjusted R-squared  0.334 
Model F Test = 1040.62  F Prob value = 0.000 
Log Amemiya PrCrt = -1.762  Akaike Info Crt = 1.076 




Variables in Model 
 Coeff  Std  Error  t-Stat  P-value 
Constant -2.027  0.076  -26.8  0.000 
Previous Owner  -0.321  0.006  -51.6  0.000 
Basic Income  0.191  0.007  25.9  0.000 
Other  Income  0.018  0.003 5.7 0.000 
Other Income Dummy  -0.147  0.029  -5.1  0.000 
AGE < 25  0.219  0.012  17.7  0.000 
AGE 25-34  0.153  0.011  14.5  0.000 
AGE 35-44  0.266  0.009  29.5  0.000 
AGE 45-54  0.165  0.008  19.9  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age < 25  0.092  0.018  5.0  0.000 
Prev Owner*Age 25-34  0.145  0.008  17.1  0.000 
Yorks&Humber 0.169  0.008  20.8  0.000 
East Midlands  0.172  0.008  21.0  0.000 
North West  0.162  0.008  20.5  0.000 
Scotland 0.179  0.008  21.2  0.000 
West Midlands  0.120  0.008  14.9  0.000 
North 0.194  0.009  20.3  0.000 
South  East  0.030  0.007 4.6 0.000 
South West  0.092  0.008  11.8  0.000 
East Anglia  0.126  0.010  12.8  0.000 
1996 -0.105  0.005  -19.3  0.000 
1997 -0.124  0.005  -23.9  0.000 
1998 -0.149  0.005  -27.7  0.000 
T_ABOVE -12.047  0.532  -22.6  0.000 
T_BELOW -49.397  1.676  -29.5  0.000 
T_ABOVE&AGE34  -2.998  0.419 -7.2 0.000 
T_BELOW&AGE34 -23.429  1.182  -19.8  0.000 













Table A: Demand Regressions  
Used to Predict Unconstrained Housing Consumption 




Intercept -3.368  -4.221 
(-74.9) (-56.4) 
Log of total income  0.646  0.594 
(152.7) (138.3) 
Log of marginal cost of housing  -0.396  -0.252 
(-83.3) (-30.8) 
Age of main or first-named borrower  0.034  0.026 
(32.4) (19.0) 
Age






2 0.406  0.419 
Dependent variable is log of housing consumption (see text).  Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
Table 10: Predicted Leverage Responses to Removal of Interest
Deductibility
over £30000 under £30000
T_above T_above T_below T_below
Coefficients -12.05 -3 -49.4 -23.47
t-ratio -22.6 -7.2 -29.5 -19.8
Cumulative Coeff -12.05 -15.05 -49.4 -72.87
tax rate Under 35 Over 34 Under 35 Over 34
household share 0.25 0.3 0.11 0.05 0.12
0.4 0.19 0.2 0.01 0.02
average loan 0.25 51818 49360 21696 17987
0.4 96440 90478 18185 19304
%decline 0.25 19.0 23.2 40.5 53.5
%decline 0.4 28.6 34.4 64.6 78.4
Table 11: The Impact on the WACC of Removing Mortgage Interest Deductibility
Full Deductibility No Decline in v  20% Decline   30% Decline   40% Decline
Tax Rate 0.4 0.25 0.4 0.25 0.4 0.25 0.4 0.25 0.4 0.25
Initial v
0.9 0.058 0.070 0.087 0.088 0.081 0.084 0.078 0.083 0.075 0.081
0.7 0.058 0.070 0.080 0.084 0.076 0.081 0.074 0.080 0.071 0.078
Percentage Increase in WACC
Initial v
0 . 9 5 0 2 64 02 13 51 8 3 01 5
0 . 7 3 9 2 03 11 62 71 4 2 31 2